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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS THE SERVANT 
OF POLITICS 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
Any assessment of what the Constitution is bad at must be 
grounded in a theory of what it is good for. So let me begin with 
a brief statement of such a theory: The Constitution is mostly 
good for providing a platform external from our ordinary politics 
from which current arrangements can be criticized. 
This theory does not entail the view that all that matters is 
criticism. Any sensible political system requires legitimation as 
well as destabilization. The theory merely asserts that our ordi-
nary political processes already provide very powerful legitima-
tion. We do not need constitutional law to endorse results that 
our existing political system has already endorsed. 
Nor does the theory entail the view that constitutional law 
necessarily privileges change. Political systems need to change, 
but they also need to maintain continuity. Although the Consti-
tution can promote change, it can also appropriately entrench the 
status quo by providing a platform to criticize proposals for 
change. 
The theory does entail the view that a constitutional provi-
sion that does no more than make us more satisfied with out-
comes that already satisfy us is not accomplishing anything 
worthwhile. This is so because constitutional law should serve as 
a corrective to ordinary politics, and, so, is corrupted when it be-
comes the servant of politics. 
If one shares my view of what the Constitution is good for, it 
follows, I think, that it is quite bad at dealing with problems of 
criminal procedure. If the Constitution were doing its job, it 
would obstruct and destabilize our political impulses concerning 
crime control. Yet today, the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments function mostly to make us satisfied with a state of affairs 
that should trouble us deeply. 
Here are two facts about American criminal law: The United 
States has the most elaborate and detailed constitutional protec-
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tions for criminal defendants of any country in the world. The 
United States also has the second highest incarceration rate of 
any country in the world.t 
The relationship between these two facts (if, indeed, there is 
one at all) is controversial. Some critics of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments argue that they stymie effective law enforce-
ment, thereby encouraging crime and requiring a high incarcera-
tion rate. Although this connection is theoretically possible, it is 
quite implausible. The best data available suggest that criminal 
procedure protections are doing very little to obstruct successful 
prosecutions. For example, a tiny percentage of criminal cases 
are lost or "no papered" because of fourth amendment 
problems.2 Virtually every empirical study of the impact of Mi-
randa suggests that it has not reduced the rate at which suspects 
confess.J The poor quality of criminal defense work has led some 
distinguished commentators to conclude that counsel now serves 
primarily as a barrier to the defendant's participation in his own 
trial.4 
In contrast, some defenders of the Constitution's criminal 
procedure provisions argue that incarceration rates would be 
even higher if these protections were unavailable. This claim is 
1. As of June, 1994, there were 1,012,851 men and women incarcerated in state and 
federal prisons. See State and Federal Prison Populalion Tops One Million, Department 
of Justice Press Release, October 27, 1994. The United States is now behind only Russia 
in incarceration rates. It has an incarceration rate more than four times that of Canada, 
more than five times that of England and Wales, and fourteen times that of Japan. See 
Steven A. Holmes, Ranks of Inmates Reach One Million in a 2-Decade Rise, N.Y. Times, 
at 1 (Oct. 28, 1994). 
2. In the course of an opinion arguing that the exclusionary rule imposes unaccept-
able costs, Justice White was forced to concede that "[m]any ... researchers have con-
cluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial." United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897,908, n. 6 (1984). A General Accounting Office study showed that in federal 
criminal prosecutions, 0.4% of cases were not prosecuted because of illegal search 
problems. Evidence was excluded in 1.3% of cases studied, and only 0.7% of those re-
sulted in acquittals or dismissals. Report of the Comptroller General of the United 
States, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 8-14 (1979). 
Studies of state prosecutions yield similar data. See National Institute of Justice, Criminal 
Justice Research Report - The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1 
(1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" 
A"ests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611. 
3. For a good summary of the empirical evidence, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Re-
considering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 435, 455-461 (1987). 
4. See Uoyd Weinreb, Denilll of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States 112 
(1977). Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer and David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: 
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of 
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73, 86 (1993) ("(I]f the Chief 
Defender values attorneys for their ability to move cases quickly and to persuade reluc-
tant defendants to plead guilty, the accused might be better off making his own, poorly 
informed choice.") 
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similarly implausible. By now, the Fourth Amendment is so rid-
dled with exceptions and limitations that it rarely prevents the 
police from pursuing any reasonable crime control tactic.s 
Although the Supreme Court continues to insist on the ritualistic 
reading of Miranda warnings, judges have virtually gone out of 
the business of actually policing the voluntariness of confessions 
and regularly sanction the sort of coercive tactics that would have 
led to the suppression of evidence a half century ago.6 The 
courts have been satisfied with formal rules requiring the pres-
ence of counsel in the courtroom, while tolerating actual court-
room performances that make a mockery of the formal 
protections. 1 And even when a defendant can demonstrate that 
the prosecution has violated minimal Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment protections, the recent evisceration of habeas 
corpus means that there may be no court available to entertain 
her claim.s 
It seems unlikely, then, that the criminal procedure amend-
ments have either exacerbated our crime problem or provided an 
effective bulwark against police and prosecutorial overreaching. 
5. In many contexts, the Court has refused "to transfer from politically accountable 
officials ... the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement tech-
niques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger," and concluded that "the 
choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the government officials who 
have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources." Mich-
igan Dept. of Stale Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 {1990). The modem Court has 
declined to treat "probable cause" as a fixed and rigid requirement that the police must 
meet before privacy is invaded. Instead, it is a "practical, nontechnical conception," 
Brinegar v. United Stales, 338 U.S. 160, 176 {1949), that is "not readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." ll/inois v. Gales, 462 U.S. 213,232 (1983). The Court 
has insisted that the expertise of the officer at the scene be taken into account, United 
Stales v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975), and that he not be shackled by post hoc judicial 
second guessing. lllinois v. Gales, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983). Even if the police act without 
probable cause, they need not fear the exclusion of evidence if they reasonably rely on a 
warrant, see United Stales v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the warrant and probable 
cause requirements themselves are riddled with exceptions. See e.g., New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691 (1987) (exception for administrative searches); California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565 {1991) (exception for automobiles); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execulives' Assn., 
489 U.S. 602 {1989) (exception for "special needs"). 
6. In the quarter century since Miranda, the Court has reversed only two convic-
tions on the ground that post-Miranda custodial interrogation produced an involuntary 
statement, compared with twenty-three Supreme Court reversals on voluntariness 
grounds in the comparable time period immediately preceding Miranda. See Louis 
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 673, 744-45 & nn. 239, 240 {1992). 
7. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (judicial review of coun-
sel's performance should be "highly deferential" and "indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.") 
8. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) {habeas unavailable after 
procedural default); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 {1989) ("new rules" generally unen-
forceable on habeas); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule generally unenforceable on habeas). 
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A third possibility is more plausible: constitutional protections 
intended to make prosecution more difficult instead serve make 
the prosecutor's job easier. 
This reversal of the historic mission of the criminal proce-
dure amendments functions on both the individual and the global 
level. In individual cases, criminal procedure protections make 
the punishment we inflict on criminal defendants seem more ac-
ceptable. Although the amendments do little to make the prose-
cutor's job harder, people commonly believe that they obstruct 
the prosecution of dangerous criminals. Some doubt and ambiv-
alence that might otherwise accompany the use of violent and 
coercive sanctions is thereby dissipated. 
On the global level, criminal procedure protections serve to 
redirect and exacerbate the popular anger about crime. While 
crime rates have remained static and even declined slightly in re-
cent years,9 the rate of incarceration has skyrocketed.to There is 
no easy way to demonstrate that the crime rate would not be 
higher if we had incarcerated fewer people, but, at a minimum, 
these statistics demonstrate that the increased rate of incarcera-
tion is not caused by an increase in crime. Instead, it seems to be 
fed by the public perception that crime is out of control and that 
still more draconian punishments are necessary to deal with it. 
Popular misconceptions about criminal procedure protec-
tions feed this perception. Because people believe that "legal 
technicalities" set large numbers of guilty and dangerous 
criminals free, they think that too many miscreants are escaping 
punishment. Because they believe that the problem could be 
brought under control if only the "legal technicalities" were 
changed, they fail to focus on the bankruptcy of mass-incarcera-
tion as a crime fighting strategy. 
In the United States today, over one million people are im-
prisoned, the largest number in our history and the second larg-
est percentage in the world.u One out of every 193 adult 
Americans is behind bars, and the total inmate population is 
9. The most recent data, from 1993, indicate that the crime rate fell by three per-
cent from the previous year, the second consecutive year of decline. The violent crime 
rate showed an annual decline of two percent. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Crime in the United States, 1993: Uniform Crime Reports 11 (1993). 
10. For the first six months of 1994, while the crime rate was declining, the number 
of prisoners grew by nearly 40,000, the equivalent of 1,500 per week. In the last decade, 
the United States prison population has doubled on a per capita basis. See State and 
Federal Prison Population Tops One Million, United States Department of Justice Press 
Release, Oct. 27, 1994. 
11. Id. 
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roughly equivalent to that of the city of Phoenix.12 Despite the 
absence of any evidence that these extreme measures have 
helped to control crime, political pressures grow for still more 
prisons, longer sentences, and more executions. 
The criminal procedure amendments have done nothing to 
slow this decline into barbarism. Instead, they have contributed 
to an atmosphere that promotes acceptance of a situation that 
ought to shock us. 
12. See Pierre Thomas, U.S. Prison Population, Continuing Rapid Growth Since 
'80s, Surpasses 1 Million, Washington Post, at 3 (Oct. 28, 1994). 
